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March 22, 1982, at 11:OO a.m. Eastern Standard Time (EST), the third launch 
of the United States Space Shuttle (STS-3) took place. 
of the two Solid Rocket Boosters (ST.3s), one 115-ft diameter main parachute failed 
on the right-hand SRB (A12). This parachute failure caused the SRB to impact the 
ocean at 110 ft/sec in  lieu of the expected "3 parachute" i m p a c t  velocity of 88 ft/sec. 
This higher impact velocity relates directly to more SRB aft skirt and more motor 
case damage. 
parachute failure, the potential risks of losing an SRB as a result of this failure, 
and to recommend fixes to ensure that the probability of chute fahres of this type 
in the future will be low. 
Center, the parachute subsystem mntractor, and Industry-recognized parachute 
experts from Sandia Lahratories. 
During the reentry phase 
A parachute failure ream was formed to assess the cause of the 
The team's members w e r e  f r o m  Marshall Space Flight 
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TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM 
STS-3 MAIN PARACHUTE FAILURE 
On Mamh 22, 1982, the third launch of the Space Shuttle (STS-3) occurred at 
11 a.m. EST. The nose cap ejection and drogue parachute deployment phase of the 
Decelerator Subsystem for both Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) reentries functioned nor- 
mally. Three main parachutes w e r e  observed on A l l  (left-hand SRB), but only two 
inflated main parachutes w e r e  noted on A12 (right-hand SRB). 
ammrly. A12 impacted the ocean at 110 ft/sec instead of the nominal 89 2 6 ft/sec 
exper- ?need with three main parachutes. 
As a result of this 
The Lead Retrieval Vesse l  (UTC Liberty) retrieved t w o  main parachutes, one 
drogue, one frustum, one SRB (A12). and an assortment of mdn parachute flotation 
debris. 
and one SRB. Since all main parachutes are released at SRB water impact, it is the 
general consensus that the missing main parachute from A12 (main chute No. 1, 
Serial No. 2065) must have sunk due to loss of canopy flotation. Pieces of this flota- 
tion w e r e  retrieved in  the general impact area by the UTC Liberty. The failed para- 
chute (main chute No. 2, Serial No. 2067) did not detach from the SRB even though 
the separation nuts had fired. This turned out to be advantageous because the flo- 
tation was missing and the parachute would have sunk had the parachute separated 
from the SRB at water impact. 
The UTC Freedom retrieved three main parachutes, one drogue, one frustum, 
An STS-3 parachute anomaly team was formed to determine the cause of the 
parachute failure and to recommend any design changes required to reduce the possi- 
bility of parachute failure on future Space Shuttle launches. A list of the parachute 
anomaly team members is shown in Table 1. Members of the team met at Kennedy 
Space Center, Florida. on March 29 through 31, 1982. to inspect STS-3 retrieved 
parachute hardware. 
The objectives of the  team were to perform a failure analysis for main parachute, 
Serial No. 2067, to identify the most probable failure scenario, to identify the potential 
risks to future mission recovery requirements, e. g., how close was a main parachute 
separation nut failure on one or both of the two remaining parachutes (the main para- 
chute separation nut is the "weak link" in the parachute structural attachment to the 
SRB and is aggravated by higher loads resulting fmm a main parachute out ) ,  and to 
identify any corrective actions that might be incorporated on STS-4 and subs to 
reduce or  remove these risks. 
The team had a pod  data base, shown in Figure 1, from which to gather inputs 
to form and support their conclusions. It was fortunate that the Vandenberg (SRB 
tracking ship) locked or,to the A12; because, if it w e r e  not €or the film data, it would 
have been difficult to reconstruct a failure sequence, and it would have been prac- 
tically impossible to have defended any team failure scenario position because of the 
lack of positive proof. 
The  first step in  defining t h e  c8use of failure w a s  to determine if any abnarmal 
loads were experienced by the failed parachute. Figu-e 2 w a s  generated using on- 
board flight recorded data. A t  t h e  time of fa i '*ne ,  the 111 kip load (approximately 
2.5 sec after line stretch) on main chute No. 2 (Serial No. 2067) was within the 
predicted load range for first stage inflation and well below the 174 kip design limit 
bad. A f t e r  the failure. the total load. normally distributed between three chutes, 
had to be shared by the two r e m a i n i n g  chutes. Thus, the second and third stage 
bads on A12 are high with main chute No. 3 (Serial No. 2066) experiencing a seamd 
stage load of 235 kips, 35 percent above thc design limit load. Even with this over- 
load. however, no additional main parachute failures resulted. 
A s  can be seen, the A l l  drogue parachute experienced higher loads on every 
A l l  h g u e  saw a peak load of 302 kips on the full open stage stage than the A12. 
(drogue design limit load is 270 kips). 
2062, 2063, and 2064) saw nominal loads. 
The three A l l  main parachutes (Serial No. 
Main parachute No. 3 (Serial No. 2066) saw a bed of 235 kips on the second 
stage of reefing. The main parachute design limit load is 174 kips. 
To ascertain the greatest amount of information in the most efficient manner, 
specific areas c l  responsibility w e r e  assigned to specific team members .  These task 
assignments are shown in Table 2. Some of these task assignments culminated in 
short essays o r  reports [l] whila others required computer programs, film analysis, 
or testing and as such, required longer "dead lines," e.g., materials certification 
required pull testing to verify material strengths. 
mens be removed from canopy 2067 which require several man-hours to  accomplish. 
Materials and Processes Laboratory had the responsibility for this effort. 
results are shown in Reference 2. 
This required that specific speci- 
Their test 
In an effort to familiarize all team m e m b e r s  with the packed geometry of the 
main parachutes and to gain a cursory understanding of the deployment process of 
the mains, a series of charts were prepared (Figs. 3, 4 ,  and 5) .  Figure 3 s h o w s  a 
side view of the packed main parachute inside its bag, fastened into the isogrid 
structure. It s h o w s  the three separate areas inside the bag, the float area (at the 
top), the canopy area, and the suspension system area (dispersion bridles and risers). 
The figure also shows the canopy compartment flaps, the lower loop on the float sys- 
tem that attaches the energy absorber to the canopy apex, and the upper loop or 
confiector strap that attaches the other end of the float energy absorber to the flat 
bridle. 
Figure 4 depicts an idealized deployment sequence of the main parachutes from 
It shows a the frustum as it is  pulled away from the SRB by the drogue parachute. 
"lines first" deployment, e. g. , the risers are the first elements out of the deployment 
bag, then the dispersion bridles, then the suspension lines, followed by the para- 
chute canopy, and lastly the main parachute fiotation system. 
that when the floats are clear of the frustum, the frustum has separated approximately 
250 ft from the SRB. 
It should be noted 
Figure 5 is  a closeup view of the relative locations of the lower portion of the 
main parachute bag and the internal structure of the frustum. 
bottom of the main parachute bag is 30 to 34 in. above the separation plane (Station 
358) of the frustum. Ideally, the main parachute would deploy out of the bottom of 
the bag in a straight down fashion and not strike any of the frustum internal struc- 
ture. However, Figure 5 shows that the parachute would only have to drift 30 deg 
sideways or conversely; the frustum would only have to tilt 30 deg to have contact 
w i t h  the parachute as  i t  is deployed out of the bag. 
contact i s  very undesirable because the rapidly deploying nylon fabric (300 
to 350 ft/sec) will melt due to frictional heat and its strength is then degraded. 
It shows that the 
Parachute/frustum structure 
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Figure 5 shows the location of a hole found in the outer bag flap. 
believed to have been caused by the abrasion of the bag flap against the frustum 
structural ring at Station 381. 
is a hazard to nylon fabric. 
This hole is 
This ring has a relatively sharp corner and, 88 such, 
After reviewing the 70mm 1204x1. film fmm the tracking ship USS Vandenberg, 
a frustum skewing phenomena w a s  observed during the main parachute deployment 
process. Dr .  Dean Wolf of Sandia Laboratories determined that this frustum skewing 
could be caused by wake turbulence overtake. H e  had coauthored a paper presented 
to the 7th Aerodynamic Decelerator and Balloon Technology Confermce October 21-23, 
1981 [3] .  That discussed the wake turbulence overtake phenomena. This Violent 
action on the drogue parachute canopy forces it sideways, and the drogue suspension 
lines then pull the top of the frustum sideways. thereby causing a rotation of the 
frustum. 
and at main parachute apex and float extraction 0.3 sec later. The angles shown 
were meas-zed f r o m  a couple of frames of the 70mm film. I t  can be seen that the 
measured 30 deg would be sufficient to pmve frustum/main parachute contact. 
concluded that the large skew angle of the frustum at the time of m a i n  parachute float 
extraction was the initial cause of the parachute damage that w a s  observed on canopy 
2067. The floats probably struck or hung up on the frustum structure durhg the 
extraction process. 
flailing around violently immediately after deployment and became entangled with the 
floats f r o m  an adjacent parachute (Serial No. 2065). 
asymmetrical loads into the vent lines. Vent line No. 51 finally failed. The sudden 
s?ored energy release caused the stretch2d vent linehadial (No. 3) to snap back. 
This recoiling vent line sheared the vent band at the radial No. 3 joint. There was 
sufficient energy left in the radial to continue shearing the top 30 to 40 horimntals 
between radials 3 and 4. 
but the 13 bottom horizontals w e r e  failed by the strain action of the -.to. 3 radial. 
Figure 7 shows the relative positioning of the three main parachutes on A12 and the 
damage sustained by No. 2067 in the '.>ex area of the canopy. Figure 8 shows a 
more detailed damage assessment of cartopy 2067. I t  can be deduced from this view 
how the floats (entangled with adjacent canopy flotation) could have caused the 
observed damage pattern. 
Figure 6 s h o w s  the frustum rotational angle at main parachute line stretch 
It is 
Further analysis of the 7Omn film showed that the floats w e r e  
This entanglement induced large 
Of the remaining 200 horizontals down to t?-* skirt, all 
To perform a complete materials evaluation, the initial action w a s  to verify that 
the materials used in the failed parachute canopy were m i  substandard materials and 
were consistent w i t h  traced design n.ilitary specification requirements. 
this, the Serial No. 2067 materials were traced back to their purchase order number 
at Pioneer Parachute Company and their apparent strengths f r o m  the lot sample load 
tests thcit tire conducted on all material buys. 
thtit canopy 2066 (lotided to 235 kips) was found to have been fabricated from the 
same material lot buys .  Table 3 shows the material and fabrication history of the 
flailed pciruchute (canopy 2067) .  plus the materials strength evaluation 
performed by hltiterials and Processes Laboratory, led to the conclusion that the 
fiiilcd ctinopy was not substandard, and that i ts  failure was not due to substandard 
structurcil cciptibility reticting to "expected" loads. 
180 in .  70mm f i lm  convinced us  that t h e  parachute failure was initiated by the skewed 
frustum causing physicnl contact with the mair, parachute canopy flotation. 
c~ritiict criused violent floiit dynamics which waterfalled into the canopy failure. The 
cwmplete fiiilure sequence is shown in Table 4 
To achieve 
A bonus from this investigation w a s  
Th i s  data,  
Further study of the 120 and 
This 
[ 4 ] .  
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To gain an understanding of w h a t  one chute out means in  t e r m s  of risks of 
losing an SRB I w e  performed a risk assessment for STS-4. 
(using predicted main parachute angles of 15 deg radial, 24 deg tangential), load 
calculations showed  a bolt tension of 168 kips. This compares w i t h  actual test data 
that showed the separation nut fails at 187 kips. 
the actual main parachute pull angles w e r e  13.3 deg radial and 14.9 deg tangential. 
These smaller angles equate to a bolt tension of 149 kips. 
means the separation nut would fail at a main parachute load of 272 kips at these 
angles. 
Decelerator Subsystem hardware. both on A l l  and A12, was performed to  discern i f  
any trends were evident and to establish preliminary refurbishment estimates. This 
data is shown in Figure 11 and revealed no Significant trends. 
Ratioing early estimates 
However, f i lm analysis s h o w e d  that 
This bolt tension capability 
A complete damage assessment of all STS-3 Fipures 9 and 10 s h o w  this data. 
Going back and relooking at STS-1 film (we could not see all of mains deploy- 
ment on STS-2 fi lm because of cloud cover), revealed that STS-1 also experienced the 
wake overtake phenomena (Fig. 12). We compared aerodynamic data from STS-1, 
STS-2. and STS-3 to see if any trends could be determined that could be used to 
predict this phenomena. Table 5 shows a listing of the aerod;iiadc parameters at 
the time of Decelerator Slibsystem deployment. No trends could be developed from 
this data since it appears to be random. 
Since it is not possible to change the drogue parachute design to reduce the 
wake turbulence overtake effects, and it is concluded that this disturbance will ran- 
domly occur during the Space Shuttle program, corrective actions, or options, w e r e  
established for the near term and long term. Table 6 shows these options and their 
rat ionale. 
The failure ana:ysis, conclusions, and recommendations are shown in Figure 13. 
We believe that the incorporation of these recommendations wil l  minimize the possibility 
of losing a parachute on future flights. 
has been removed and the main parachutes will  remain attached to the SRB, by one 
attach point, after water impact to provide for retrieval access. 
it is planned to incorporate a smoothing liner in the main parachute bag cmopy flaps. 
Also. smoothing the  frustum interior from the deployment bag exit plane to the 
frustum exist plane, attaching floats to the main parachute attach fittings (releasing 
parachutes at S R B  water impact), and lowering the main parachute bags in the 
frustum are options being studied for STS-7 and subsequent Space Shuttle launches. 
On STS-4, 5 ,  and 6,  the canopy flotation 
Starting with STS-7, 
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DArA AVAILABLE - A12 
FLIGHT HARDWARE - MAIN PARACHUTES S/N 2066 AND 2067 
70mm FILM COVERAGE (TRACKING SHIP) 
0 50 in LENS - "SMALL IMAGE" 
0 120 in LENS - "GOOD COVERAGE. NO WATER IMPACT' 
0 180 in LENS - "GOOD COVERAGE, INTERMITTENT FOCUS PROBLEM" 
RADAR TRACK DATA 
FLIGHT RECORDER DATA 
0 PARACHUTE LOADS 
0 EVENTTIMES 
0 ACCELERATIONS 
0 RATES 
ATMOSPHERIC DATA 
Figure 1. STS-3 data base. 
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EVALUATION SUMMARY 
PREDICTED - MlN N S  MAX 
117 160 294 
191 234 303 
231 272 328 
WATER IMPACT VELOCITY 
ACTUAL 
A12 - A1 1
274 le0 
281 245 
307 292 
-
PREDICTED - 3 MAINS 89 ft/= -I 6 
2 MAINS = 113 ft/= 
A l l  (3 MAINS) - TBD (ALL DATA NOMINAL) 
A12 (2 MAINS) - 110 it/= (PRELIM RADAR/PHOTO) 
IST PEAK 
A12 2NDPEAK 
3RD PEAK 
PARACHUTE LOADS (KIPS) 
@J NOM - 2065 2087 2066 
75 98 120 90 111 110 
107 146 197 181 FAILED 233 
97 142 182 180 FAILED 193 
0 DROGUE 
1ST PEAK 
2ND PEAK 
3RD PEAK 
0 MAINS 
1ST PEAK 
A l l  2NDPEAK 
3RD PEAK 
107 146 197 104 1M) 144 I 97 142 182 I 98 136 115 
13gure 2 .  S T S - 3  flight evaluation data. 
6 
w a 
7 
oR\awL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUALm 
8 
ORIGINAL PAGE Is 
OF POOR Q U m  
a 
6 
9 
ORICtilAL PAGE IS 
OF POOR QUAi(M 
TIME = 377.2 
APEX AND FLOAT 
EXTRACr’3N 
PARACHUTE 
EXTRAMION 
DIRECTION 
TIME = 376.9 
LINE STRETCH 
PARACHUTE 
EXTRACTION 
DIRECT10 N 
Figure 6. Frust urn orientation during STS-3 parachute deploymeat. 
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MAIN PARACHUTE SEPARATION NUTS (A121 
NUT SERIAL NO. MAIN CHUTE NO. REFERENCE DESIGN NO. 
m30 1-1 X31 F8 
OOO 35 1-2 X31 F9 
000 36 (STAYED ATTACHED) 2-1 X31F10 
m38 2-2 X31 F11 
000 39 3-1 X31F12 
X31F13 OOO 40 (HIGH LOAD - 120 KIPS) 3-2 
EP42 BOLT TENSION ESTIMATE FOR A12 3-2 (BASED ON BOLT TENSION CALCULATlOlYS 
FROM ED22 STS-3 ATTACH PT. LOAB)  
151,301 x 120,ooO 
108,135 
= 167,902 Ib 
MORE LIKELY BOLT TENSION ESTIMATE (BASED ON STS-3 OBSERVF- AND CALCULATED 
RADIAL AND TANGENTIAL ANGLES OF 13.3 AND 14.9 DEG RESPECl rVELY) 
FOR 120 KIP FITTING LOAD T b h m  l49,OOO Ib 
ASSUMING BOLT ULTIMATE OF 187,000 Ib 
EACH ATTACH POINT COULD TAKE 150,000 Ib (CHUTE LOAD OF 272,000 Ib) 
Figure 9. A12 separation nul bcatisns and lohd calculations. 
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MAIN PARACHUTE PEAK LOADg (KIPS1 - ONE CHUTE FAILS AT 1ST INFLATION 
sTs-3ACtUALS sTs.4 PREDICTED DISPERSED 
1ST PEAK 
2ND PEAK 
3RD PEAK 
94 111 114 127 99 99 
186 FAILED 236 2 W  FAILED 187 
181 FAILED 194 260 FAILED 163 
*AT MAX PREDICTED STS-4 LOAD: MAIN P.3RACHUTE SAFETY FACTOR REMAINING 5 
SEPARATION NUT SAFETY FACTOR REMAINING = 
1.03 (REQ'T = 1.25, STS3 PREFLIGHT = 1.m) 
1.18 aiiEQ7 1.50, STS-3 PREFLIGHT= 1.38) 
MAIN CHUTE MAXIMUM CAPABILITY - ASSUMING USED CHUTES 
MAXIMUM FAILING LOAD = 338 KIPS (NO TEST VERIFICATION) 
NO SAFETY FACTOR REMAINING 
MAIN CHUTE SEPARATION NUT CAPABILITY - PULL ANGLES FROM STS3 FILM 
MAXIMUM FAILING LOAD - 150 KIPS/FITTING (FROM TEST DATA) 
EQUIVALENT PARACHUTE LOAD = 272 KIPS WITH 10 PERCENT LOAD ASYMMETRY. 
IMPLIES SERIOUS CONCERN FOR LOSS OF SRB 
Figure 10. S T S - 4  risk assessment. 
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SREDSL Sfs-3 PARACHUTE CONOlTloAl 
0 S R B A l l  
ALL c m s  RWVEREOI: 
MAINS SIN 2 o e  2063.2084 
DROGUE rn 1029 
0 SRBA12 
0 ONLY Two MAIN CHUTES RECOVERED: 
SIN DAMAGED W R I N G  RETRIEVAL 
SIN 2067 EXTENSIVE IN-FLIGHT DAMAGE 
0 DROOUEWN 1030: 
MINOR DAMAGE 
MAIN CHUTE SIN 2087 DAMAGE S U W R Y  
FLOAT DAMAGE 
FLOAT SEPARATED FROM CANOPY BEFORE RETRIEVAL 
0 BOTH SIDE FLOATS SEPARATED FROM CENTER FLOAT 
0 FLOAT BAG BRIDLE LEGS PULLED AWAY FROM SIDE FLOATS (COMPLETE WITH ADD 
0 CENTER FLOAT BAG TORN WHERE SIDE FLOAT BRIDLE LEGS CROSS BOTTOMSURFACE 
0 PLA C A V l W  FILLER AND CENTER FLOAT BRIDLE LEGS INTACT 
0 EXTENSIVE FRICTION BURN ON OUTBOARD END OF CENTER FLOAT 
0 ENERGY ABSORBER STROKE TYPICAL OF OTHER UNITS (Sfs-1, STS-2, ANDSTS-3) 
0 LOWER LOOP CONNECTING ENERGY ABSORBER TO CANOPY APEX NOT RECOVERED 
0 SEVERE BURNING INSIDE ENERGY ABSORBER LOWER END LOOP (ONE PLY). NO 
BURNING ON UPPER END LOOP 
ON REINFORCING W E B  - lCTlB62-5267-01) 
VENT AREA DAMAGE 
0 VENT BANDS SEVERED AT RADIAL NO. 3 
0 VENT LINE NO. 51 SEVERED, 3 in. FROM VENT BAND (CONTINUATION OF VENT 
LINE NO. 3) 
0 SEVERE ABRASION OF VENT LINES, GORES 42 THROUGH 59. ABRADED VENT LINES 
SHOW GREEN COLOR ON INSIDE OR OUTSIDE SURFACES 
0 BROKEN STITCHES IN VENT LINE JOINT GORES 48,47,43. AND 42 
CAP'*- 'Y DAMAGE 
0 VENT BAND FAILED IN VENT BANDlRADlAL INTERSECTION AT RADIAL NO. 3. 
TYPICAL TENSION FAILURE INDICATED. NO EVIDENCE OF CONTACT ON OUTSIDE 
OF VENT BAND 
0 250 HORIZONTAL RIBBONS SEVERED I# GORE BETWEEN RADIALS 3 AND 4 
0 34 HORIZONTAL RIBBONS SEVERED IN GORE BETWEEN RADlAlS 2 AND 3 
0 HORIZONTAL RIBBONS SNAGGED AND PARTIALLY TORN, GORES 96 THROUGH 6, 
RIBBONS 30 THROUGH 60 
0 HORIZONTAL RIBBONS WITH BURNS. GORES 75 THROUGH 81, RIBBONS 8 THROUGH 20 
0 HC3IZONTAL RIBBONS WITH BURNS AND O/D THREAD FRAGMENTS, GORES 4 AND 5, 
i .  BgONS 86 THROUGH 99 
0 MISCELLANEOUS BURNS, SNAGS, PARTIALLY TORN RIBBONS DISTRIBUTED OVER 
REST OF CANOPY 
DEPLOYMENT BAG 
0 TEFLON CLOTH LINER PULLED AWAY, OUTBOARD ARC OF BAG 
0 FRICTION BURN ON CANOPY FLAP NO. 4, INSIDE SURFACE, HOLE THROUGH FLAP 
0 CANOPY FLAP NO. 8 TORN FROM BOTTOM END 22 in. (OF 36 in.) 
0 LOCAL FRICTION BURNS ON CANOPY FLAPS 5,0,7, AND 8 
0 FPI 3 rlON BURN AND HOLE ON BAG MOUTH FLAP NO. 4, INSIDE SURFACE 
MAKu - CHUTE S/N 2086 (A121 DAMAGE SUMMARY 
0 10 HORIZONTAL RIBBONS TORN IN GORES 6 AND 6 NEAR VENT (POSSIBLE 
RETRIEVAL DAMAGE) 
0 19 HORIZONTAL RIBBONS TORN IN GORE 63 NEAR SKIRT (OBSERVED SNAGGING ON 
STERN ROLLER. UTC LIBERTY) 
Figure 1 1 .  S ' j ' S  3 p r r w h u t e  subsystem damage assessment .  
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0 NUMEROUS SMALL BURNED HOLES IN CANOPY. MANY BUWED FROM OUTSIDE 
0 NO OTHER SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE OR DlSCOLORATlON EXCEPT FOR DlNOY ORAY 
APPEARANCE IN TOP OF CANOPY 
0 FLOAT ASSEMBLY AND ENERGY AODULATOR ATTACHED TO CANOPY AND IN GOOD 
CONDITION 
0 PLASTIC STRIP ENTANGLED IN VENT LINES (WSSIBLY FROM FRUSTUM LSC) 
0 550 tb NYLON CORD ENTANGLED IN 2 RISERS (CORD OF TYPE NOT USED IN 
ASSEMBl Y OR PACKING OF CHUTESl 
0 BAG MOL, TH PULL LOOPS ON RISERS HAVE BROKEN STITCHES 
0 ALL 4 REEFING LINE CUTTERS FIRED 
0 CARGO LINKS NOT CADMIUM PLATED 
DROGUE CHUTE WN 1030 (A121 DAMAGE SUMMARY 
0 WEAVE SEPARATION ON 11 RADIAL EXTENSIONS (LESS SEVERE THAN ON STSl 
OR STS2) 
0 WCKET BAND STITCHES BROKEN 
0 6 POCKET BANDS LOOSE, ONE END 
0 DAMAGE AND BLACK DlSCOLORATION AT LOWER END OF SUSPENSION LINE GROUPS 
NEAR WRAP (POSSIBLE CONTACT WITH BSM COVERS OR POWER BLOCK) 
0 ALL REEFING LINE CUTTERL FIRED 
MAIN CHUTE SIN 2082 (A111 DAMAGE SUMMARY 
CHARRED PIECE OF LAMINATE MATERIAL (ABOUT 2 IN. SQUARE) FUSED INTO HORI- 
ZONTAL RIBBONS (POSSIBLY FROM ENGINE NOZZLE) 
0 NUMEROUS OTHER PIECES OF LAMINATE THROUGHOUT CANOPV 
0 NO SiGNlFlCANT DAMAGE OR DISCOLORATION IN VENT AREA 
0 FLOAT ASSEMBLIES ATTACHED TO CANOPY AND IN GOOD CONDITION 
0 BAG MOUTH PULL LOOPS ON RISERS HAVE BROKEN STITCHES 
0 ALL 4 REEFING LINE CUTTERS FIRED. CUTTER ACTUATION LANYARD BROKEN AND 
SEAR MISSING 
MAIN CHUTE SIN 2063 (A1 1) DAMAGE SUMMARY 
0 10 HORIZONTAL RIBBONS TORN IN GORES 71 AND 72 IN MIDDLE OF CANOPY 
0 NO SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE OR DISCOLORATION IN VENT AREA 
0 CHARRED LAMINATE MATERIAL FUSED INTO HORIZONTAL RIBBONS, GORE 68. 
NEAR SKIRT 
0 2 STRIPS OF BLASTIC ENTANGLED IN ENERGY ABSORBER AND CANOPY (POSSIBLY 
FROM FRUSTUM LSC) 
0 LOWER CUTTER RETENTION LOOP BURNED, GORE 24 (POSSIBLY FROM STRIP OUT OF 
2ND STAGE REEFING LINE) 
0 ALL 4 REEFlhG LINE CUTTERS FIRED 
e GLOAT ASSEMBLY COhNECTED TO CANOPY AND IN GOOD CONDITION 
IWAllri GHUfE SIN 2064 ( A l l )  DAMAGE SUMMARY 
0 LOWER CUTTER RETENTION LOOP BURNED, GORE 24 (POSSIBLY FROM STRIP OUT OF 
2ND STAGE REEFING LINE) 
0 SUSPENSION LINE NO. 96 PARTIALLY TORN, 3 ft FROM SKIRT 
0 NO SIGNIFICANT DAMAGE OR DISCOLORATION IN VENT AREA 
0 FLOAT ASSEMBLY ATTACHED TO CANOPY AND IN GOOD CONDITION 
0 NUMEROUS PIECES OF LAMINATE MATERIAL THROUGHOUT CANOPY 
END 
0 ALL 4 REEFING LINE CUTTERS FIRED 
BLACK DlSCOLORATlON WITH BURNED EDGES OW ONE RISER - 10 ft FROM LOWER 
DROGUE CHUTE S/N lO2B ( A l l )  DAMAGE SUMMARY 
0 MINOR WEAVE SEPARATION ON 15 RADIAL EXTENSIONS (LESS SEVERE THAN ON 
STS1 OR STS-2) 
0 POCKET BAND STITCHES BROKEN 
0 10 POCKET BAN06 LOOSE, ONE END 
0 ALL 4 REEFING LINE CUTTERS FIRED 
Figure 11. (Concluded) 
16 
E a
5 
3 
Q 
ta 
4 
3 
3 
17 
FAILURE DUE TO A COMBINATION OF: 
0 LARGE FRUSTUM ANGLE AT TIME OF PARACHUT T DEPLOYMENT 
0 CANOPY AND/OR FLOTATION CONTACT WITH FRUSTUM 
0 FLOTATION TO FLOTATION CONTACT OR ENTANGLEMENT 
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS RECOMMENDED 
0 ELIMINATE APEX FLOTATION DESIGN 
0 INCORPORATE "SMOOTHING" LINER IN DEPLOYMENT BAG CANOPY FLAPS 
0 FRUSTUM CONTACT ISSUE 
BEST SOLUTION - MOVE FRUSTUM SEPARATION PLANE z 2  ft FORWARD 
0 ALTERNATE SOLUTION 
- FAIR (SMOOTH) FRUSTUM INTERIOR FROM DEPLOYMENT BAG 
EXIT TO FRUSTUM EXIT PLANE 
- LOWER MAINS DEPLOYMENT BAGS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE (6-11 in.) 
0 PROVIDE FLOTATION VIA: (1) LEAVE ATTACHED TO BOOSTER 
(2) FLOAT VIA DECK FITTING FLOTATION 
FLIGHT E FFECTlVlTY 
STS4/SUBSEQUENT - DISCONNECT APEX FLOTATION AND LEAVE PARACHUTES 
ATTACHEDTOBOOSTER 
ASAP - IMPLEMENT SOLUTION TO FRUSTUM CONTACT ISSUE 
REQUEST KSC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RETRIEVING 
e PARACHUTES ATTACHED TO THE BOOSTER 
e PARACHUTES RELEASED, FLOATING VIA DECK FITTING FLOTATION 
OTHER 
Figure 13. Team conclusions /recommendations. 
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TABLE 1. STS-3 PARACHUTE ANOMALY TEAM MEMBERS 
MEMBERS 
?rSFC - R .  Runkle, EP14 
K. Henson, E E l l  
D .  Kross, ED22 
S. Reed, EG22 
D.  Bacchus, ED32 
R .  Nichols, EH34 
W .  Coiner, EP42 
B. Woodis 
F. Tallentire 
PPC - B. Rodier 
T. Metz 
SANDIA - D r .  D .  Wolf 
I .  Ho:t 
B1M C - D. Moog 
TABLE 2. TEAhl TASK ASSIGNMbNTS 
~~ ~ 
Vnndenberg Film Assessment 
Parachute Hardware Damage 
Interface Hardware Damage 
Partic hu t e / SR B G e o  m e  t r y 
Potential STS-4 Risks 
Correctivc Action Options 
Nylon Bliiterid iind Joint Strength 
Cano Analysis 
Failure Scenario 
Loads Definition 
Dave Bacchus/ED 32 
Frank Tallentire/MMC 
Roy 3 unkle/ EP 1 4  
Frank Tallentire/MMC 
Dick Moog/MMC 
Roy Runkle/EP14 
Bob Rodier /PPC 
Dean Wolf/SANDIA 
Bill WoodisIMMC 
Denny Kmss./ED 22 
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TABLE 3. S!N 2067 MATERIAL HISTORY 
Material and Fabrication History 
Material on both canopies came f r o m  same lot 
All finished dimension n,?asurements in  specification after fabrication. 
No fnbrication anomalies rxtted in crown area on fabrication travelers. 
hlinor anomalies noted for lower canopy on fabrication travelers. 
dispositioned per standard shop processes) 
Basic muterids infarmetion. 
of material. 
(All anomalies 
Vent Band 
4000 lb 
Vent Line 
6000 lb  
1 Jpper Hori z .  
1000 l b  
Lower Horiz. 
160 l b  
RlIL Snec 
MIL-T - 5608 
TY 6 CLE 
RII L-W - 37657 
TY 3 
RlIL-T - 5603 
TY 2 CLE 
hlIL-T - 5608 
TY 3 CLD 
P.O. Number 
(Pioneer) 
56395 
56389 
56393 
563 92 
Receiving Inspection 
T e! 
L O W  
4500 lb 
ti980 lb 
1180 lb 
492 lb 
S 
Average 
4912 lb 
7210 lb 
1219 lb 
533 lb 
TABLE 4. A12 MAIN PARACHUTE FAILURE SEQUENCE 
~ ~ 
Event 
1. L a r g e  deployment angle. 
2. L a r g e  deployment angle 
damaged float and initiated 
violent float dynamic activity. 
3. t~otation system from chutes 
1 and 2 become temporarily 
entangled placing large 
lateral loads on vent. 
4. Vent line No. 51 fails at a 
chute load of 110,000 lb. 
5. Dynamic unloading of the 
broken radial caused a failure 
to propogate along nearly the 
entire length of gore three. 
Suppokting Evidence 
Flight photographs. 
Photo examination shows three float 
segments separated from cluster. 
Only center segment attached to 
bridles at retrieval. 
Photos show violent float dynamics. 
Extensive b w n  marks and green 
stain on vent lines, gore 43 
througn 58. 
Stitch failure on vent lines gore 48 
and 49. 
Extensive burning on lower loop of 
energy absorber. 
Center float assembly not attached 
to chute at retrieval. 
Energy absorber strokes at 8,000 
to 12,000 lb. This could cause 
failure or damage to one ply of 
attach loop. 
Load cell data. 
Inspection of failed hardware. 
C A N 0  analysis and strain energy 
calculations s h w  sufficient strain 
energy would exist to fail the 
entire gore, which very nearly did 
happen. 
21 
I 
00In u,CU 
mo, d m  
'u, d N  c r m  
ZCD coco w w  
d N F) e In W 
22  
TABLE 6. POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS/OPTIONS 
1 AC'I'ION 
FLOTATION 
1. DG nothing. 
2. F emove /deadivat e floats . 
Leave m a i n s  attached at impact. 
(Deactivate sep. nuts). 
3. Redesign main float, leave @ Apex 
(i .e. ,  make smaller and/or change 
attach concept. ) 
1. Attach floats to attach fittings. 
FR UST Uhl 
1. Raise frustum separation plane. 
2. Smooth out inside surface of 
frustum and/or lower main bags 
as Goon as practical. 
RATIONALE 
New float design - STS- Usubsequent. 
Lack of positive evidence. 
Low risk % 1 :18 and pmbeWity of SRB 
survival with 2 chutes. 
Floats would not hang up or  tanfle during 
Retrieval personnel wot&l - ?me cargo 
Preliminsty retrieval pers oncurrence 
extraction. 
links during retrieval c! ion. 
obtained. 
Reduce load in canopy by size reductim. 
Make float attach points non-structural 
memLrs (i.e. , sacrificial). 
Floats would not interfere with depby- 
Parachutes will float canopy down. 
ment . 
Eliminates hard structure for potential 
contact when parachutes exit 
deployment bags. 
Reduce depbyment damage by providing 
a smooth surface and reduce likelihood 
of contact. 
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